The aim of this paper is to cast new light on an important and often overlooked notion of perspectival knowledge arising from Kant. In addition to a traditional notion of perspectival knowledge as "knowledge from a vantage point" (perspectival knowledge1), a second novel notion -"knowledge towards a vantage point" (perspectival knowledge2) -is here introduced. The origin and rationale of perspectival knowledge2 are traced back to Kant's so-called transcendental illusion (and some of its pre-Critical sources). The legacy of the Kantian notion of perspectival knowledge2 for contemporary discussions on disagreement and the role of metaphysics in scientific knowledge is discussed.
to constructivist or relativist positions, notwithstanding widespread readings of Kant's perspectivalism along these lines.
2
For Kant put forward two rather distinct notions of perspectival knowledge. The first, and by far better known and discussed, is "knowledge from a vantage point" (let us call it perspectival knowledge1). Perspectival knowledge1 is knowledge afforded by our cognitive faculties; for Kant, these are the faculties of sensibility and of understanding, in the first instance. Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy, and the central role assigned to synthetic a priori judgments has been the locus classicus for discussions of perspectival knowledge in the literature, with an emphasis on the active and constructive activity of the human mind in making phenomena 'objects of possible experience' for us. On this first notion, Kant's perspectival knowledge is understood as a reaction against what might be called absolute knowledge, or knowledge 'from nowhere' (to borrow the Nagelian expression): i.e. knowledge whose main task is to produce accurate or veridical representations of a ready-made world.
3 This was the kind of knowledge defended by Locke no less than Descartes, no matter how different their respective views were on how our minds deliver such accurate (and not deceitful) representations of a ready-made world. Perspectival knowledge1 is Kant's considered response to this well-entrenched philosophical tradition that spanned across empiricism and rationalism.
2 For example, Boghossian (2006, p. 18) lists Kant alongside social constructivists although clearly contemporary social constructivists would emphasize the contingency of the socially constructed facts by contrast with Kant: "The ordinary notion of a constructed fact is perfectly compatible with the idea that a particular construction was forced, that we had no choice but to construct that fact. According to Kant, for example, the world we experience is constructed by our mind to obey certain fundamental laws, among them the laws of geometry and arithmetic. But Kant did not think we were free to do otherwise. On the contrary, he thought that any conscious mind was constrained to construct a world which obeys to those laws. The social construction theorist is not interested in such mandated constructions. He wants to emphasize the contingency of the facts we have constructed…". Along similar lines, Nelson Goodman in the Introduction to Ways of Worldmaking presents Kant as the forefather of the view he calls radical relativism under rigorous restraints (1973, p. x) "I think of this book as belonging to the mainstream of modern philosophy that began when Kant exchanged the structure of the world for the structure of the mind". Putnam (1981, p. 63) : "On Kant's view, any judgment about internal or external objects (physical things or mental entities) says that the noumenal world as a whole is such that this is the description that a rational being (one with our rational nature) given the information available to a being with our sense organs (a being with our sensible nature) would construct…. What then is true judgment? Kant does believe that we have objective knowledge…But what is truth if it is not correspondence to the way things are in themselves?.... the only answer that one can extract from Kant's writing is this: a piece of knowledge (i.e. a 'true statement') is a statement that a rational being would accept on sufficient experience of the kind that is actually possible for beings with our nature to have". Rorty (1979 Rorty ( /2009 : "With Kant, the attempt to formulate a "theory of knowledge" advanced half the way towards a conception of knowledge as fundamentally "knowing that" rather than 'knowing of'…Unfortunately, however, Kant's way of performing the shift still remained within the Cartesian frame of reference; it was still phrased as an answer to the question of how we could get from inner space to outer space. His paradoxical answer was that outer space was constructed out of the Vorstellungen which inhabited inner space". 3 See Putnam (1990) , p. 18: "I shall try to connect the failure of the ideal of a God's-eye view with the central problems of Western philosophy from the time of Kant….Kant was deeply torn between the idea that all knowledge is partly our own construction and the idea that knowledge must yield what I have called a 'God's-Eye view.'". For reasons of space, I cannot engage here in a textual discussion of the third Critique and I shall concentrate my attention to the relevant passages of the first Critique where perspectival knowledge2 is introduced and justified. 5 "It is knowledge….pertaining to these spectacles. It is knowledge pertaining to our own epistemic faculties….We cannot take the spectacles off"" (Moore 1997 (Moore /2006 . In Moore's reading, since we cannot know things in themselves, this "entails the perspectivalness of all our representations, where 'our representations' are again taken to be those that make any real sense to us" (p. 123). 6 See Adrien Moore (1997 Moore ( /2006 ) on this point: "Our representations are from the point of view of possible human experience. They involve concepts that concern the way things appear to beings with certain epistemic faculties, most obviously faculties that involve the imposition of a spatio-temporal structure on what is known. Representations of the same type could not be produced from other points of view (This means that the representations are not only perspectival, but radically perspectival). But the transcendent possibility of being occupying other points of view is not ruled out." (p. 123) Moore concludes: "This illustrates…the idea that the unity of reality is determined by its being held together at the transcendental level. This holding together is part of the transcendent process whereby we contribute a conceptual structure to reality, allowing for things to be some way or other. It is something that we effect ourselves. Indeed it is something that each of us effects severally. 
Ideas of reason as foci imaginarii
In the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant set out the goals and aims for the faculty of reason, and clarified the important distinction between reason and understanding. While the faculty of understanding offers concepts through which the spatio-temporal manifold of the faculty of sensibility is conceptualized into objects of experience, "reason on its side unites the manifold of concepts through ideas by positing a certain collective unity as the goal's of the understanding actions" (A644/B672). Whereas the understanding does not consider the totality or unity of objects of experience, the specific role of reason-in its regulative use-is precisely to order the objects of experience according to the totality of their series. In this context, Kant introduces the famous metaphor of the focus imaginarius:
[transcendental ideas] have an excellent and indispensably necessary regulative use, namely that of directing the understanding to a certain goal respecting which the lines of direction of all its rules converge at one point, which, although it is only an idea (focus imaginarius) -
i.e. a point from which the concepts of the understanding do not really proceed, since it lies entirely outside the bounds of possible experience-nonetheless still serves to obtain for these concepts the greatest unity alongside the greatest extension. Now of course, it is from this that there arises the deception, as if these lines of direction were shot out from an object lying outside the field of possible empirical cognition (just as objects are seen behind the surface of a mirror); yet this illusion (which can be prevented from deceiving) is nevertheless indispensably necessary if besides the objects before our eyes we want to see those that lie far in the background, i.e., when in our case, the understanding wants to go beyond every given experience (…) and hence wants to take the measure of its greatest possible and uttermost extension (A645/B673).
The faculty of reason in its regulative use is said to accomplish a vital task in Kant's theory of knowledge. It provides systematic unity "in accordance with necessary laws" to what would otherwise only be a contingent aggregate of cognitions delivered by the faculty of understanding.
As an example, Kant refers to the ideas of "pure earth, pure water, pure air" routinely employed in the chemistry of his own time to classify all materials and to explain their chemical effects along mechanical lines (A646/B674). 10 Reason, in its hypothetical use "is therefore directed at the systematic unity of the understanding's cognitions, which is the touchstone of truth for its rules. Conversely, systematic unity (as mere idea) is only a projected unity, which one must regard not as given in itself, but only as a problem" (A647/B675 (ii) Necessary: why are ideas of reason necessary (despite being illusory)?
(iii) Indispensable: why are ideas of reason not just necessary but 'indispensably necessary'?
For Kant, an idea (or, equivalently, a "concept of reason") is "a concept made up of notions, which goes beyond the possibility of experience" (B377), where "notions" (notio) are nothing but pure concepts that have their origins "solely in understanding". Thus, contra Hume, Kant warns, it is "unbearable to hear a representation of the color red called an idea. It is not even to be called a notion (a concept of the understanding)" (B377). 13 Going back to our point (i) above, why are 11 Most notably, Grier (1997 Grier ( , 2001 ), Allison (1983 Allison ( /2004 and Rescher (2017) . Zuckert (2017) takes the three official transcendental ideas (soul, world, God) as "placeholders" for the purpose of securing empirical knowledge: "Specifically, I shall suggest that the ideas function as 'optimistic placeholders': they function as encouragement to investigation, suggesting (if illusorily) that there is something "out there" to be found in on-going empirical investigation. Precisely because they are nearly empty, however, the ideas do not predetermine the results of that investigation; they are mere placeholders for empirical results of properly empirical investigation. Because they present objects that will never be known by empirical science, moreover, the ideas also mark the limits of empirical scientific investigation as such, indicating that it will never be fully adequate to the demands of reason. Thus, I shall suggest, the ideas serve as schemata for -aids for the application or (perhaps better) proper employment of -the regulative principles by (paradoxically) preventing their application directly to the empirically given.". use" in directing the understanding to a certain goal "respecting which the lines of direction of all its rules converge at one point" (A644/B672), a point which-while illusory (focus imaginarius) because the concepts of the understanding do not really proceed from it-the focus imaginarius "nonetheless still serves to obtain for these concepts the greatest unity alongside the greatest extension" (A644/B672).
Ideas of reason offer the understanding rules for seeking out systematic unity among its cognitions. They do so not by positing (or hypostasizing) fictitious objects as ideal grounds.
Instead, ideas accomplish their indispensably necessary regulative function by laying down the rules that the understanding ought to follow.
Ideas act as rules to bestow systematic unity upon the understanding's cognitions, so that we can encounter nature as an ordered system and not just a contingent aggregate of unrelated objects of experience. They fulfill this task by offering an imaginary standpoint (focus imaginarius), from which "the concepts of the understanding do not really proceed" but that "nonetheless still serves to obtain for these concepts the greatest unity alongside the greatest extension" (A644/B672). In other words, think of the focus imaginarius not so much as an indeterminate placeholder for some object. Think of it instead as an imaginary standpoint from which lines are shot out, like in perspectival drawing. These lines constrain and structure the abstract space of reason within which the understanding's cognitions are ultimately located. To fully understand this point, and its implications for perspectival knowledge2, it is worth taking a closer look at the origin of Kant's metaphor of the focus imaginarius and its underlying rationale and inspiration.
Origins of the metaphor of the focus imaginarius in the pre-Critical period.
There is only one other place in Kant' from spirit-seers, because "they see something which no other normal person sees; they have their own community with beings that reveal themselves to no one else, no matter how good his senses might be" (2:342). Kant calls these metaphysical systems "apparitions", "figments of the imagination", "reveries" because they are types of images that "delude the senses by presenting themselves as genuine objects, hatched out by the dreamer himself" (2:343).
Solipsism borne out by metaphysical reveries is, in my view, a very important clue in understanding the metaphor of the focus imaginarius that Kant introduces a few paragraphs later.
For Kant develops the analogy between the dreamers of reason and spirit-seers, who even when fully awake "refer certain objects to external positions among the other things which they really perceive around them. And the question here is simply how it happens that they transpose the illusion of their imagination and locate it outside themselves, and do so in relation to their body" (2:343-344). In other words, how is it possible for spirit-seers to transpose the imagined objects as existing externally in the world?
To answer this question, Kant introduces the metaphor of the focus imaginarius as a "point of convergence of the lines indicating the direction in which the sensation is transmitted when it makes an impression (focus imaginarius). It is in this way that the place of a visible object, even when it is seen with one eye only, is determined." (2: 344 knowledge is always perspectival1, because it is from a specific point of view (namely, the point of view of our own epistemic faculties and the knowledge claims they afford). Yet, for Kant, perspectival knowledge ought to be shared with our peers, it must be unanimous, otherwise it cannot be qualified as genuine knowledge, but only as "bogus knowledge" (2:349) or "opinion" If my judgments do not remain invariant when I put myself in the position of someone's else reason-"which is independent of myself and external to me"-my judgments cannot legitimately claim unanimity and universality. To clarify this important point: the fact that our knowledge is always perspectival1-namely, it is from the point of view of our own epistemic faculties, i.e. understanding and its categories, although obviously in this 1766 pre-Critical text Kant only speaks of "understanding"-does not per se generate solipsism. However, it does not preclude it either. For it is possible that each and every individual epistemic agent could separately employ the categories of the understanding so that each would have her/his own phenomenal world (all similar in some respects, because the working of the understanding are presumably the same; but solipsistic phenomenal worlds, nonetheless).
Thus, the ability to be invariant under the "scales of the understanding" anticipates a crucial aspect of Kant's transcendental illusion in the Appendix and later development of perspectival knowledge2 in the first Critique, in my view. It is not enough for an individual's epistemic agent and her faculties to sanction her/his own judgments about X (be it Swdeborg's spirits, or
Wolff's Order of Things). These judgments would not qualify as genuine knowledge that can legitimately attain unanimity and universality, until they get sanctioned by other epistemic agents, via the faculty of reason "which is independent of myself and external to me".
Echoing Adrien Moore on Kant's transcendental solipsism (see footnote 6), and zooming back into the Appendix and the Critical period, the lingering worry about perspectival knowledge1 is the following. Although constitutive a priori principles of the understanding might well grant the apodeictic certainty of scientific judgments, the universality and unanimity of such judgments is not equally secured by constitutive a priori principles alone. The problem with perspectival knowledge1, as I see it, originates from the way Kant defines the truth of a judgment as "the agreement of a cognition with its object" (CPR B83). The object in question for Kant clearly is not a noumenal object; for we do not have knowledge of noumenal objects. But it cannot be an object of experience either (or at least, this cannot be the complete and final Kantian story) since objects of experience are the outcome of applying constitutive a priori principles of the understanding to the spatio-temporal manifold of the faculty of sensibility (as per perspectival knowledge1). And the risk arises that different epistemic agents might form judgements whose "agreement with the object" might ever so slightly diverge. In other words, there is a lingering worry that any synthetic a priori judgment obtained thus and so may only have a private validity, so to speak, without proving invariant under the scales of understanding (to echo the language of Dreams). Kant seems to be facing the following problem about perspectival knowledge1:
1. Scientific judgments are synthetic a priori judgments obtained by applying a priori categories and principles of the understanding to the spatio-temporal manifold of the faculty of sensibility.
2.
Scientific judgments are true as long as there is "the agreement of a cognition with its object" (B83).
3. But the object, through which the truth of a scientific judgment is proved and with which every scientific judgment of the same kind has to agree (for it to be true), is not and cannot be a noumenal object (whose knowledge is precluded to us).
4.
Such an object is not and cannot be an object of experience either. For we cannot use our own schematized concepts of the understanding as the hallmark for assessing whether our scientific judgments are true or not.
5.
Thus, our epistemic faculties of sensibility and understanding jointly cannot ratify the truth of the scientific judgments they afford (as per perspectival knowedlge1).
6. An object is required as a common ground, upon which the scientific judgments afforded by the epistemic faculties of different epistemic agents (as per perspectival knowedlge1) can all agree. inter se). The touchstone of whether taking something to be true is conviction or mere persuasion is therefore, externally, the possibility of communicating it and finding it to be valid for the reason of every human being to take it to be true; for in that case there is at least a presumption that the ground of the agreement of all judgments [der Grund der Einstimmung aller Urtheile], regardless of the difference among the subjects, rest on the common ground, namely the object, with which they therefore all agree [zusammenstimmen] and through which the truth of the judgment is proved" (CPR A 821/B 849). See XXX, on which I draw here.
Nonetheless, it is an "indispensably necessary" unity required for epistemic agents like us to be able to know that their judgments are indeed true, that they do not have just a private validity, and that match with other epistemic agents' judgments that things are indeed thus-and-so. How to translate Kant's view of ideas as foci imaginarii for contemporary discussions about disagreement in science (and the possible role of metaphysics in it) is the topic of the next and final Section.
Perspectival knowledge2, disagreement, and the role of metaphysics
Let us take stock on Kant's transcendental illusion. In terms of the threefold puzzle presented in Section 2:
(i) Illusory: why are ideas of reason illusory (a focus imaginarius)?
(ii) Necessary: why are ideas of reason necessary (despite being illusory)?
Granted our earlier answer to (i) in terms of (I-Rule), it should now become clear why ideas qua 'rules' are "indispensably necessary". If the interpretive line canvassed in Section 3 is on the right path, a tension arises between the subjectivity at stake in our act of judging that things are a certain way (from the point of view of our epistemic faculties as per perspectival knowledge1) and the need for agreement among individual judgments [zusammenstimmen, A821/B849] that different epistemic agents can make about things being thus-and-so. That Kant perceived such tension and felt the need to secure agreement among individual judgments is evident from the context in which the discussion of focus imaginarius first takes place. In Dreams Kant was concerned with the thorny topic of popular reports about Swedenborg's paranormal powers, a topic on which, unsurprisingly, judgments wildly diverged and doxastic knowledge dominated.
It might then be argued that Kant felt the need to secure conversational agreement about wildly diverging reports about ghost-stories and Swedenborg's powers. Such dangerously solipsistic scenarios ought to be banned, while also allowing, for example, the "fleeting illusion"
of the immortality of the soul to play a role in the scale-pan of hope. I suggest that their role is to offer metaphysical ideas of natural kinds (in particular, ideas of genera and species through which he articulates the regulative principle of systematicity -via homogeneity, specification, and continuity-in the Appendix). He took ideas of reason as supplementing the synthetic a priori knowledge afforded by sensibility and understanding (perspectival knowledge1) because without such illusory yet indispensably necessary ideas, no conversational agreement could ever be guaranteed. To unpack this important point, and to appreciate its farreaching implications, let me briefly turn to some contemporary debates in the epistemology of disagreement.
John MacFarlane has recently drawn a distinction between inter-conversational disagreement, and intra-conversational disagreement in the context of a wider discussion about contextualism and relativism.
Intra-conversational disagreement is disagreement among two or more interlocutors; whereas interconversational disagreement runs deeper among epistemic communities. According to MacFarlane, the contextualist typically constructs the intra-conversational disagreement (on matters of taste, for example) in terms of the subjective speaker's preferences (as when I say that "rhubarb crumble is delicious" and my friend Mary says "rhubarb crumble is not delicious"). The problem with the contextualist approach is that it does not seem to fully capture the disagreement. Interlocutors would seem to talk past each other, rather than genuinely disagreeing on a commonly shared subject matter.
Hence, the contextualist has to introduce some remedy, namely what Keith DeRose, following David Lewis, calls "single scoreboard":
instead of taking partially subjective discourse to be (partly and covertly) about the speaker, we take it to be (partly and covertly) about some aspects of the shared conversational score. Thus, for example, the score might include a shared epistemic standard that changes as the conversation evolves, getting more stringent when the stakes are high and less stringent when they are low (MacFarlane 2007, p. 19) .
MacFarlane however complains that the contextualist remedy "does not give us enough disagreement. It gives us disagreement only within the bounds of a single 'conversation'-something for which it makes sense to imagine a shared scoreboard. ….The problem with single scoreboard approach is that it explains only intra-conversational disagreement, leaving inter-conversational disagreement unaccounted for" (MacFarlane 2007, pp. 20-1) . MacFarlane then argues that where the contextualists' shared scoreboard strategy fails, the relativist might succeed.
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In what follows, I give my Kantian twist to the contextualist scoreboard approach and show how it can successfully deliver on matters of (scientific) inter-conversational disagreement. Taking the cue from Kant, metaphysical ideas of natural kinds (to use a contemporary proxy for what Kant called "pure earth, pure water, pure air" or "fundamental power") play an "indispensably necessary"
19 MacFarlane (2007), pp. 26-27 , develops the relativist idea of a genuine disagreement in perspectival terms (it must be stressed once again that his primary concern is with matters of taste -"funny", "delicious" -rather than with scientific disagreement). He articulates the relativist view that two parties disagree (as assessed from context C) if (ibid., p. 26):
"CAN'T BOTH BE ACCURATE (RELATIVE TO C). (a) there is a proposition that one party accepts and the other rejects, and (b) the acceptance and the rejection cannot both be accurate (as assessed from C)."
Perspectival accuracy is in turn defined as follows (ibid., p. 26):
"PERSPECTIVAL ACCURACY. An acceptance (rejection) of a proposition p at a context CU is accurate (as assessed from a context CA) iff p is true (false) at the circumstance <WCU, SCA>, where WCU = the world of CU and SCA = the standard of taste of the assessor at CA."
The net outcome of this relativist strategy is that two parties may genuinely disagree, because accepting proposition p in world of CU and rejecting proposition p in world of CU cannot both be accurate (as assessed from CA and from the standards of the assessor at CA). Thus, disagreement is regained by relativizing accuracy to the perspectival context of assessment. e.g. in the Appendix, where we are told that the faculty of reason in its hypothetical use as being directed "at the systematic unity of the understanding's cognitions, which is the touchstone of truth for its rules" (CPR A 647/B 675). And again in the Canon in the first Critique where Kant says that "The touchstone of whether taking something to be true is conviction or mere persuasion is therefore, externally, the possibility of communicating it and finding it to be valid for the reason of every human being to take it to be true; for in that case there is at least a presumption that the ground of the agreement of all judgments, regardless of the difference 21 Although not a relativist himself, LaPorte draws a conventionalist conclusion out of this imagined scenario: "We cannot say that our space travellers were just flat wrong in concluding that D2O is not what they had been calling 'water' and that we are just plain right in concluding that it is" (LaPorte 2004, p. 107).
among the subjects, rest on the common ground, namely the object, with which they therefore all agree and through which the truth of the judgment is proved" (CPR A 821/B 849).
Echoing MacFarlane (see footnote 19) with all the necessary caveats (since I am not endorsing his underlying defense of relativism), I suggest reading the indispensably necessary role of Kant's (I-Rule) in settling inter-conversational disagreement as follows:
(I-RULE) INDISPENSABLE NECESSITY: A judgment is accepted (or rejected) as true (or false)
by a community of epistemic agents EC1 iff the judgment is true (or false) at <WEC1, IRuleCA>, where WEC1 is the world of the epistemic community EC1 and I-RuleCA is the idea acting as a 'rule' (i.e. as an imaginary standpoint playing the role of a "shared conversational scoreboard") in an ideal context of assessment CA.
Going back to the example of deuterium oxide, the inter-conversational disagreement between the Earthlings and the Earth scientists as to whether D2O is or is not a kind of water, depends very much both on facts about the worlds (Twin Earth and Earth, respectively) where these judgments are respectively made (e.g. Twin Earth is filled with deuterium oxide in a way that planet Earth is not); and, importantly for my story, also on the metaphysical ideas of natural kinds that each community endorses as a conversational scoreboard. It is ultimately the Earth scientists commitment to the idea of "pure water" (say, the metaphysical idea of water qua mostly protium oxide that might come in isotopic varieties) that underpins their acceptance of D2O as a kind of water ('heavy water'). But the Earthlings did not share with the Earth scientists a common idea of "pure water" (considering also the abundance of D2O on the hypothetical Twin Earth). And it is the lack of a common metaphysical idea of "pure water", shared with the Earth scientists, that explains why the Earthlings judge D2O not as a kind of water, but as a completely different chemical substance (that they dubbed dwater). Cases of scientific inter-conversational disagreement can be explained and analysed in perspectival terms, if (following Kant) one takes ideas of reason (qua ideas of natural kinds) as the imaginary standpoints from which individual scientific judgments can be proved right or wrong, and their universal validity and unanimity secured.
Leaving aside hypothetical (and unrealistic) Twin Earth scenarios, it is the standpoint of our human reason-a standpoint we all equally share in the endeavor called 'scientific knowledge'-that allows us to converge and reach universality and unanimity of judgments.
Without "pure water", my cognition of this sample of ¹H₂¹⁶O as water, and your cognition of that sample of ²H₂¹⁷O as water, and Martha's cognition of her sample of ³H₂¹⁸O as water (and so on),
could not be unified into shared and universally agreed upon scientific knowledge about water and its isotopic varieties. Without "pure earth", my cognition of this sample of lanthanides, and your cognition of that sample of scandium, and Martha's cognition of her sample of yttrium, and so on, could not be unified into shared and universally agreed upon scientific knowledge about rare earths and their chemical properties.
The hypothetical use of reason and the systematic unity that (I-Rules) afford accomplish then a vital task for scientific knowledge: they make our scientific knowledge collective, the kind of knowledge we can all agree upon (by contrast with bogus knowledge or doxastic knowledge, where differences of opinions, disagreements, and conflicting reports dominate). The space of reason is not a space populated by real metaphysical objects or real natural kinds with Putnamian microstructural properties. Pure water, pure earth, pure air do not pick out, or stand for real metaphysical objects (forever precluded to our epistemic faculties). Instead, they provide the shared imaginary standpoints where possibly diverging judgments can be assessed, proved to be true or false, and accepted or rejected accordingly. That is why the transcendental illusion might be deceptive in letting us suspect that there might indeed be objects, when there is in fact none.
There are no natural kinds "rare earths", or "pure water", or "fundamental power" carving nature at its joints. Instead, there is only a multifarious and complex variety of physical and chemical phenomena, which we nonetheless learn to recognize, classify, and scientifically know as "rare earths", "pure water", or "fundamental power".
To conclude, our knowledge claims are never just effected by our own conceptual resources, at the cost of different epistemic agents (or communities) advancing contradictory and incompatible judgements about the same subject matter. Metaphysical ideas of natural kinds are "indispensably necessary" in providing the shared perspectival2 standpoint, where individual scientific judgments can be evaluated, proved true, and either retained or withdrawn. Without these imaginary standpoints, there cannot be a correct empirical use of the understanding for Kant. Far from running into solipsism, perspectival knowledge2 is Kant's best safeguard against it, and against the dreams of the reasoners, spirit-seers, and metaphysicians alike, who either do not share a focus imaginarius; or, worse, fall prey of the deception of taking the illusion for reality.
